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CHARTING INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE:
AN ANALYSIS OF HALL V. NALCO AND THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RECOGNITION OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
proscribed discrimination in the workplace based on sex, the woman's
quest for equality in the workplace has become increasingly realized.1
Congress's enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in
1978 clarified Title VII by providing that discrimination based on sex
includes discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions."' 2 The PDA reaffirmed a commitment to equality
by seeking to remove pregnancy-based discrimination as an obstacle
for women who desire to experience motherhood without sacrificing
their place in the workforce.3
Recent advances in reproductive medicine have eliminated certain
barricades to motherhood, and the development of assisted reproduc-
tive technology has afforded more women the opportunity to experi-
ence motherhood than ever before. Assisted reproductive
technologies-such as in vitro fertilization-offer a second chance at
parenthood to women and couples previously incapable of conceiving
a child; the opportunities created are vast. For example, a cancer pa-
tient-whose treatment may lead to infertility and difficulties with
childbirth-may now use assisted reproductive technology to preserve
her fertility; 4 a young woman who experiences premature menopause
now has the potential to become pregnant through assisted reproduc-
tive technology;5 and a couple in which one or both partners have
1. See Christine G. Cooper, The Search for Sex Equality: A Perspective from the Podium on
Law and Cultural Change, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 446 (2005) ("[Tjhe Pregnancy Disability Act
and amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ... have effected an enormous cultural
change.").
2. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4749 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
4. See Mohamed A. Bedaiwy et al., Fertility Preservation in Cancer Patients, in CLINICAL RE-
PRODUCrIVE MEDICINE AND SURGERY 485, 490 (Tommaso Falcone & William W. Hurd eds.,
2007). Aggressive cancer treatment causes difficulties with fertility and difficulties in healthy
childbirth. Id. at 485.
5. See USA Today Highlights Top 25 Since 1982, AM. HEALTH LINE, July 17, 2007. "Physi-
cians at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, in 1983 take an egg from one woman and
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HIV now has new opportunities for safe and healthy conception. 6
Millions of women affected by infertility are afforded opportunities to
conceive where the potential did not previously exist.
The simultaneous pursuit of equality in the workplace and the avail-
ability of increased options for achieving pregnancy have created new
tensions in the law. While Title VII requires that employees of both
sexes be treated equally in the workplace, the reality is that biological
differences make men and women fundamentally distinct.7 Based on
these distinctions, the precise meaning of discrimination "because of
sex," as described in Title VII, and "because of pregnancy," as defined
in the PDA, becomes difficult to ascertain.8 While only women are
able to become pregnant, infertility as a medical condition is not lim-
ited to women. 9 In fact, men are equally susceptible to infertility and
they too can seek infertility treatments.10 In the courts, the line is
blurred between infertility as a medical condition common to both
sexes and infertility as a condition related to pregnancy.1' The ques-
fertilize the egg with sperm from the husband of a 25-year-old woman who experienced prema-
ture menopause, a procedure that results in the first infant conceived with a donor egg." Id.
6. See Th6r~se Delvaux & Christiana N6stlinger, Reproductive Choice for Women and Men
Living with HIV: Contraception, Abortion and Fertility, 15 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 46, 55
(Supp. 2007).
7. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 445.
While nearly everybody believes in sex equality, there is little understanding about
what sex equality means. Indeed, there is confusion about what is meant by "sex." The
problem is that we know that women are different-they can make babies-but we do
not quite know what to make of that difference. American law bases its equality doc-
trine on "formal equality," which requires that likes be treated alike, and allows differ-
ences to be treated differently. But if women are different from men . . . how can
equality between the sexes be achieved?
Id.
8. See id.; see also John Kohl et al., Recent Trends in Pregnancy Discrimination Law, 48 Bus.
HORIZONS 421, 421 (2005) (noting that although the PDA's prohibition of discrimination against
women sounds simple enough, it "may be one of the least understood of the legal protections
afforded to women who work").
9. See Merck, Introduction: Infertility, http://www.merck.com/mmpe/secl8/ch256/ch256a.html
(last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
10. See Mayo Clinic, Infertility: Causes, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/infertility/DS00
310/DSECTION=causes (last visited Aug. 2, 2009); University of Chicago Medical Center, Infer-
tility, http://www.uchospitals.edu/online-library/content=P01532 (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
11. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 128, 129 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993); see also Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-
structuralist Theory for Feminism, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S
LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 611, 614 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996).
Scott summarizes the sameness/difference debate surrounding sex inequality:
In the past few years, "equality-versus-difference" has been used as a shorthand to
characterize conflicting feminist positions and political strategies. Those who argue
that sexual difference ought to be an irrelevant consideration in schools, employment,
the courts, and the legislature are put in the equality category. Those who insist that
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tion remains whether fertility issues fall within Title VII's purview; in
other words, at what point does a woman's infertility or infertility
treatment become related to pregnancy within the meaning of the
PDA?
The role of infertility treatments in sex discrimination analysis has
yet to be definitively decided. 12 In Hall v. Nalco, when the Seventh
Circuit's decision addressed in vitro fertilization in the workplace, it
became the first circuit court to hold that an employer's decision to
terminate a female employee for undergoing in vitro fertilization
would violate Title VII.13
This Note explores the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hall v. Nalco
and argues that its interpretation of sex discrimination in the work-
place was in line with the objectives of the PDA. Part II examines
Title VII and the federal prohibition of sex discrimination in the work-
place; provides a brief description of infertility, assisted reproductive
technologies, and in vitro fertilization; and explores the status of infer-
tility treatment in sex discrimination law prior to Hall.14 Part III dis-
cusses the Hall decision.15 Part IV expounds on the holding in Hall
and analyzes the appropriateness of the holding in light of the PDA's
objectives. 16 Further, Part IV evaluates the implications of the Hall
decision for sex discrimination cases involving employers' benefit
plans, and it predicts that the Seventh Circuit would hold that surgical
impregnation procedures must be covered by otherwise comprehen-
sive policies.1 7 Finally, Part V addresses the practical implications of
Hall for sex discrimination law, employers, employees, and the devel-
opment of assisted reproductive technologies.1 8
II. FEDERAL PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: TITLE VII AND THE PDA
In order to aid an analysis of Hall v. Nalco, this Part provides an
introduction to the federal prohibition on sex discrimination in the
appeals on behalf of women ought to be made in terms of the needs, interests, and
characteristics common to women as a group are placed in the difference category.
Scott, supra, at 614.
12. The Supreme Court has not yet evaluated infertility treatments for women under a Title
VII sex discrimination analysis.
13. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 647-49 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
14. See infra notes 24-107 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 108-123 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 124-200 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 211-250 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 251-267 and accompanying text.
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workplace, as well as a brief discussion of infertility and infertility
treatments and their role in sex discrimination law. Section A of this
Part introduces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its prohi-
bition of sex in the workplace. 19 Section B discusses General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, in which the U.S. Supreme Court limited the scope of
Title VII by holding that an employer's exclusion of pregnancy-based
medical costs was not sex discrimination. 20 Section C addresses the
PDA, which codifies Congress's reaction to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gilbert.21 Section D provides the basics of infertility, assisted
reproductive technology, and in vitro fertilization. 22 Finally, Section E
discusses the status of sex discrimination jurisprudence dealing with
infertility and infertility treatments prior to Hall v. Nalco.23
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against individuals because of their sex.24 The statute
lists a number of unlawful employment practices, including discharge,
refusal to hire, or discrimination with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. '25 Title VII pros-
cribes both intentional discrimination and sex-neutral policies that dis-
proportionately impact individuals based on sex.26
To establish a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may proceed under
either one of two theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact.27
A disparate treatment analysis focuses on the motivation of the em-
ployer, seeking to identify unlawful intentional discrimination.28 The
"simple test" is whether an employer's policy or decision demon-
strates "treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's
19. See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The statute states that it is unlawful for an em-
ployer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
25. Id.
26. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sex-Based Discrimination, http://
www.eeoc.gov/types/sex.cfm (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
27. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW & PRACTICE 115 (Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Eliza-
beth J. Norman eds., 2001). "It bears emphasis that these categories are not analytically airtight
and that particular employer practices, in the hands of capable advocates, may implicate two or
more modes of proof." Id.
28. See id.
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sex would be different. '29 In disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff
may prove discriminatory treatment by using direct evidence that "can
be interpreted as an acknowledgement of discriminatory intent by the
defendant," but in practice, this evidence is rarely available.30 Absent
direct evidence demonstrating an employer's discriminatory motiva-
tion, however, a plaintiff may prove discrimination using indirect evi-
dence from which discriminatory intent may be inferred. 31 Under this
indirect evidence method, the court employs a burden-shifting frame-
work that was first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.32 This test first requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, elements of which vary depending on the al-
leged discrimination. 33 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate and non-dis-
criminatory reason for its action or policy. 34 If the employer does so,
the plaintiff must prove that the employer's proffered reasons did not
truly motivate the practice, but were a pretext for discrimination.35
Under the disparate impact theory, the focus of the analysis is on
the discriminatory effects of an employer's practice rather than on the
employer's motivation or intent. 36 Disparate impact claims typically
address facially neutral employment practices that have dispropor-
tionate adverse impacts on women.37 These disparate impact claims
are founded on the premise that although intentional discrimination
may be absent, an employer's neutral practice may "deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment opportunities. ' 38 Just as in dis-
29. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (quoting L.A. Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)).
30. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 115 (quoting
Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law
Outlook on Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1990)).
31. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 128-29.
32. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), cited in Texas Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
33. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. The specific elements of a prima facie case of disparate
treatment depend on the facts of a particular case. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 130. A prima facie case, generally speaking, requires that a plaintiff
demonstrate that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified to perform her
job, (3) she was subject to adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees not
in the protected class were not subject to such adverse employment action. Id. at 130.
34. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
35. See id.
36. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY
IN THEORY & DOCTRINE 71 (2d ed. 2007).
37. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 181.
38. Id. at 183. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to "limit, segregate, or
classify... employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
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parate treatment claims, courts use the burden-shifting framework
when the plaintiff proceeds under a disparate impact theory. To es-
tablish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a facially neutral practice has had a significantly dis-
criminatory impact. 39 An employer must then demonstrate a manifest
relationship between the requirement and the employment. 40 As in
the disparate treatment context, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrat-
ing that the employer's reasoning was a pretext for discrimination. 41
Title VII provides two affirmative defenses to an allegation of sex
discrimination. For both disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims, a discriminatory practice does not violate Title VII when the
sex classification is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation" of the employer's business.42 Ad-
ditionally, a practice that has a disparate impact does not violate Title
VII if the employer demonstrates that the practice is "job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity. '43
B. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: Frustrating Congress's Intent to
Remove Women from the Margins of the Workplace
The interpretation of "discrimination" and "because of sex" under
Title VII has been the subject of much litigation. In General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, a 1972 decision that severely limited the scope of the
phrase "because of sex," the Supreme Court held that an employer's
exclusion of pregnancy coverage from an otherwise comprehensive
health plan did not violate Title VII.44 In Gilbert, the employer's disa-
bility plan for its employees excluded disabilities arising from preg-
nancy while providing coverage for all other non-occupational
sicknesses and accident-related injuries. 45 The majority held that the
employer's plan did not violate Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation,46 likening Title VII analysis to that under the Equal Protection
Clause.47 The majority noted that pregnancy, while confined to
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2).
39. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
40. See id. at 446-47.
41. See id. at 447.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
44. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
45. See id. at 127.
46. See id. at 145-46.
47. See id. at 133. The Court relied on Geduldig v. Aiello, decided two years prior to Gilbert,
in which employees challenged a disability plan that excluded pregnancy coverage as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 487-89 (1974). The Gil-
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2010] CHARTING INFERTILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 1289
women, was not comparable to other covered diseases or disabilities
because it is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition. '48
Adopting a facial parity test, the Court reasoned that there was "no
risk from which men [were] protected and women [were] not."49 The
majority explained that "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an
additional risk, unique to women," and that a failure to compensate
for that risk did not destroy the parity of the benefits.50 The employer
simply removed one physical condition from its list of compensable
disabilities. 51
Justices Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. 52 Justice
Brennan rejected the majority's conceptual framework of the case as
incompatible with the objectives of Title VII. 53 He reasoned that the
court inappropriately relied on the plan's equal inclusion of mutual
risks, instead of the adverse impact on women from the unequal ex-
clusion of the female-specific disabilities arising from pregnancy. 54
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, stated that the employer's policy
placed the risk of pregnancy-caused absence in a class by itself.55 This
made the policy discriminatory "by definition" because "it is the ca-
pacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male."' 56 The majority's interpretation, according to the dis-
senters, frustrated Title VII's purpose of "eliminat[ing] those discrimi-
natory practices and devices which have fostered [sexually] stratified
job environments to the disadvantage of [women]. '57
bert majority adopted the Equal Protection Clause as a "starting point" in interpreting discrimi-
nation under Title VII. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133.
48. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
49. Id. at 138. The Court reasoned as follows:
For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique
to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the pre-
sumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the
facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. To hold otherwise would endanger the common-
sense notion that an employer who has no disability benefits program at all does not
violate Title VII even though the "underinclusion" of risks impacts, as a result of preg-
nancy-related disabilities, more heavily upon one gender than upon the other. Just as
there is no facial gender-based discrimination in that case, so, too, there is none here.
Id. at 139-40.
50. Id. at 139.
51. See id. at 134.
52. See id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion also criticized
the majority's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause when interpreting Title VII. Id. at
160-61.
56. Id. at 162.
57. Id. at 160 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
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C. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978: Congress
Reacts to the Fallacy of Gilbert
Congress reacted swiftly to the Gilbert Court's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in
1978.58 This amendment to Title VII provides a definition of "because
of sex" in order to clarify Congress's intended meaning of sex discrim-
ination under Title VII.59 The amendment clarifies that the phrase
"because of sex" includes "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions. '60 Enacted to combat "the
view of women as marginal workers," the PDA's definition of "be-
cause of sex" was meant to restore Congress's original intent behind
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination, and the amendment ex-
pressly adopted the reasoning of the Gilbert dissenters. 61
The PDA did not create new rights under Title VII, but it "made
clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex."'62 The amendment, according to the House Report, would eradi-
cate the need to rely on a discriminatory impact analysis by clarifying
that distinctions based on pregnancy are "per se violations of Title
VII.'63
D. Infertility, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, and
In Vitro Fertilization
Reproductive science has changed significantly since Congress's de-
cision to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions
in its definition of "because of sex." A basic understanding of infertil-
ity and assisted reproductive technology is necessary to analyze the
holding of Hall v. Nalco and the relationship between Hall and Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex," as provided by
the PDA.
The medical definition of infertility is a "1-year period of unpro-
tected intercourse without successful conception. ' 64 Infertility is com-
monplace among couples, affecting 10% to 15% of all couples
58. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 2.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
61. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
62. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008) (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683-85 (1983)).
63. Id.
64. Gary M. Horowitz, Female Infertility, in CLINICAL REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND SUR-
GERY 507, 507 (Tommaso Falcone & William W. Hurd eds., 2007).
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attempting to conceive. 65 Approximately one out of every four
women experience infertility for which they seek medical assistance,66
and 1.2 million women of reproductive age have had an infertility-
related medical appointment in the previous year.67
Infertility can be caused by male factors or female factors because
both men and women can suffer from infertility. Male factors cause
infertility in 30% of infertile couples, while female factors cause infer-
tility in 37% of couples. 68 Of the remaining couples, about 20% have
infertility caused by a combination of both male and female factors. 69
Unexplained infertility accounts for the remainder. 70 Some of the
most common causes of infertility in males are low or abnormal sperm
production and impaired sperm delivery. 71 Causes of female infertil-
ity include fallopian tube damage, endometriosis, ovulation disorders,
early menopause, thyroid problems, and cancer treatment. 72
Treatment for infertility varies. About 90% of infertility cases can
be treated medicinally or by surgical repair of reproductive defects. 73
Ovulation medications and surgeries to correct fallopian tube block-
age and endometriosis are common treatments for women.74 Certain
types of male infertility can be treated through surgical procedures,
such as correction of anatomic abnormalities and sperm retrieval. 75
The 1980s "revolutionized reproductive medicine" by introducing as-
sisted reproductive technology.76 Since the 1980s, assisted reproduc-
tive technology has helped women become pregnant, most frequently
through the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF).7 7 IVF is the most
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology: Home,
http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
68. Dana A. Ohl et al., Evaluation of Male Infertility, in CLINICAL REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE
& SURGERY 525, 525 (Tommaso Falcone & William W. Hurd eds., 2007); Horowitz, supra note
64, at 509.
69. See Ohl et al., supra note 68, at 525.
70. See Merck, Introduction: Infertility, supra note 9.
71. See id.
72. See Mayo Clinic, Infertility: Causes, supra note 10.
73. University of Chicago Medical Center, Infertility, supra note 10.
74. See id.
75. See Peter N. Kolettis, Surgery for Male Infertility, in CLINICAL REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE
AND SURGERY 793, 793 (Tommaso Falcone & William W. Hurd eds., 2007) ("Treatment of surgi-
cally correctable male factors is cost-effective and can spare the female partner invasive proce-
dures and potential complications associated with the use of assisted reproductive
technologies.").
76. See UC Davis Fertility Center, Assisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.
ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/fertility/assisted-reproductive-technology (last visited Aug. 2, 2009).
77. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology:
Home, supra note 67.
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common and most effective method of assisted reproductive technol-
ogy78 and is used to treat infertility caused by both male and female
factors. 79 The process of IVF involves extracting a man's sperm and
using it to fertilize a mature egg that has been surgically retrieved
from a woman, and then implanting the embryos back into the
woman's uterus several days later.80 Although more effective than
other methods, the process of IVF takes several weeks and often re-
quires multiple treatments in order to be successful.81
E. The Status of Infertility in the Law Under Title VII
Prior to Hall v. Nalco
As assisted reproductive technology becomes more advanced and
as more couples are able to achieve pregnancy when conventional
treatments fail, issues surrounding infertility and infertility treatments
are becoming commonplace in the law.
The Supreme Court has dealt limitedly with fertility in Title VII
cases in the context of an employer's fetal protection policy. In John-
son Controls, the Court held that the employer's policy, which banned
fertile women-but not fertile men-from working certain jobs, was
facially discriminatory under Title VII.82 The employer, a battery
manufacturer, enacted the policy because of the health risks associ-
ated with exposure to lead, which is used during the manufacturing
process.8 3 The Court reasoned that the policy classified its employees
on the basis of childbearing capacity "rather than fertility alone. '8 4
The Court noted that the employer's exclusionary policy "explicitly
classifie[d] on the basis of potential for pregnancy. '8 5 The Court
stated that a classification based on the potential for pregnancy is "ex-
plicit sex discrimination" under the PDA.8 6
In the years following the Johnson Controls decision, several district
and circuit court decisions addressed infertility treatment issues under
Title VII with differing analyses and results. In Pacourek v. Inland
78. See id.
79. See University of Chicago Medical Center, Infertility, supra note 10.
80. See id.
81. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18449 at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008) (quoting MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK
1069-70 (3d ed. 2003)).
82. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). The primary focus of
the Court's opinion was whether the exclusion was acceptable under Title VII as a bona fide
occupational qualification. See id. at 200-11.
83. See id. at 190-92.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
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Steel Co., the Northern District of Illinois held that "a woman's medi-
cal condition rendering her unable to become pregnant naturally is a
medical condition related to pregnancy" under the PDA.87 Because
the court held that the condition was related to pregnancy, termina-
tion based on the employee's condition would violate Title VII.88 The
court reasoned that "if potential pregnancy is treated like pregnancy
for purposes of the PDA, it follows that potential pregnancy-related
medical conditions should be treated like pregnancy-related medical
conditions for purposes of the PDA."'8 9 The Court explained that its
holding requires that employers treat a woman's medical infertility
with neutrality in order to comply with the PDA.90
Taking a different approach to infertility analysis under Title VII in
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the Eighth Circuit held that
an employer's denial of coverage for infertility treatments for a female
employee did not constitute illegal discrimination. 91 In Krauel, the
employer's medical benefit plan excluded coverage for infertility
treatments for both its male and female employees. 92 The court dis-
tinguished pregnancy from infertility by noting that pregnancy occurs
after conception, while infertility prevents conception. 93 Thus, accord-
ing to the court, infertility is "strikingly different" than pregnancy or
childbirth. 94 The court concluded that infertility is not protected by
the PDA "because it is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical
condition. ' 95 The court then distinguished the Johnson Controls con-
clusion that discrimination based on potential pregnancy is actionable
under the PDA.96 The court reasoned that potential pregnancy "is a
medical condition that is sex-related because only women can become
pregnant, ' 97 but that the employer's policy in Krauel did not classify
based on potential pregnancy. 98 Because the employer's policy denied
medical coverage for all infertility treatments, the court concluded
that the policy was "gender-neutral" and that Johnson Controls was
thus inapposite.99
87. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (N.D. I11. 1994).
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1403.
91. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cit. 1996).
92. See id. at 680.
93. See id. at 679.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 680.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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Similarly, the Second Circuit's decision in Saks v. Franklin Covey
Co. held that the exclusion of infertility treatments from an em-
ployer's benefits plan did not violate Title VII.1oo The employer's
plan provided benefits for infertility products and procedures, but it
expressly excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures. 1°1
The court first determined that infertility was not a "related medical
condition" under the PDA.10 2 The court relied on the Supreme
Court's indication in Johnson Controls that discrimination based on
"fertility alone" would not violate Title VII.103 The Saks court inter-
preted the PDA to require that a medical condition be unique to
women in order to be a medical condition related to pregnancy. 10 4
The Saks court noted that infertility afflicts men and women with
equal frequency, so it is not unique to women and thus could not be a
related medical condition under the PDA.10 5 Further, the court con-
cluded that the employer's policy did not violate Title VII under a
discriminatory impact analysis because while only women undergo
surgical impregnation, the procedures are necessary to treat male, fe-
male, or couple infertility.10 6 The court reasoned that male and fe-
male employees were equally disadvantaged by the exclusion, so the
plan had no discriminatory impact. 10 7
III. HALL V. NALCO: TERMINATION BASED ON IVF IS
ACTIONABLE UNDER TITLE VII
In Hall v. Nalco, the Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to
address whether terminating a female employee for undergoing in vi-
tro fertilization procedures violates Title VII. The facts of Hall pro-
ceed as follows. Cheryl Hall was a sales secretary who was employed
by Nalco Company.108 Hall took a three week leave of absence to
undergo IVF in an attempt to become pregnant but was unsuccess-
ful. 109 After returning to work, Hall requested another leave of ab-
100. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
101. See id. at 341.
102. Id. at 346.
103. Id. at 345-46.
104. See id. at 346.
105. See id. The court also reasoned that "[i]ncluding infertility within the PDA's protection
as a 'related medical condition[ ]' would result in the anomaly of defining a class that simultane-
ously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimina-
tion." Id.
106. See id. at 347.
107. See id.
108. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
109. See id. at 645-46.
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sence for a subsequent IVF procedure. 110 Nalco decided to terminate
Hall during a reorganization of the company and a consolidation of its
offices."' Hall was informed that the discharge was in her "best inter-
est due to [her] health condition," and her performance reviews cited
"absenteeism" due to "infertility treatments. 1 12 Hall brought an ac-
tion under Title VII alleging sex discrimination. 113 The district court
granted summary judgment for Nalco, reasoning that Hall could not
prove sex discrimination because the gender-neutral condition of in-
fertility is not protected under the PDA.114 To support its conclusion
that Hall's allegations did not state a Title VII claim, the district court
relied on Krauel and Saks, in which the Eighth and Second Circuits
held that the PDA does not require an employer to cover infertility
treatment in its benefit plans as long as male and female infertility
treatments are treated equally.115
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Hall's allegations were
sufficient to state a claim under the language of the PDA.1 6 The
court criticized the district court's reasoning and its reliance on the
"fertility alone" language from Johnson Controls, where the Supreme
Court had admonished classifications based on childbearing capacity
"rather than fertility alone.1 17 The court recognized that the holding
in Johnson Controls implied that classifications based on infertility
alone do not violate the PDA.118 However, the court concluded that
"even where (in)fertility is at issue, the employer conduct complained
of must actually be gender neutral to pass muster."11 9 The court rea-
soned that Nalco's decision, as alleged, was not gender neutral be-
cause employees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF will
always be women, just like those who take a leave of absence to give
birth.120 A medical procedure such as IVF is performed only on
women, precisely because of their childbearing capacity. 121 Therefore,
Hall was not discharged based on infertility, but instead based on her
110. See id. at 646.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 645; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
117. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 647-48 (quoting Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187.
198 (1991)).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 648.
120. See id. at 648-49.
121. See id. at 645.
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childbearing capacity. t22 Under the PDA, disparate treatment based
on childbearing capacity is, on its face, discrimination because of
sex.
123
IV. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Hall shapes the current status of
sex discrimination law. Section A addresses the relationship between
infertility, infertility treatments, and the PDA by organizing potential
infertility-related classifications into an "infertility chart."'1 24 Section
B analyzes the Seventh Circuit's decision in light of congressional in-
tent behind the PDA, and it argues that the Seventh Circuit's holding
is more faithful to Congress's intent than contrary holdings in the Sec-
ond and Eighth Circuits. 125 Section C addresses the potential reach of
Hall to the different categories on the infertility chart. 126 Finally, Sec-
tion D examines the application of Hall to employment cases involv-
ing employer benefit plans for medical and health coverage. 127
A. What Hall Means for Infertility Cases: Charting Infertility
The Supreme Court in Johnson Controls created the backdrop
against which infertility cases have been analyzed under Title VII:
while a classification based on infertility alone might not amount to
sex discrimination under the PDA, a classification based on the poten-
tial for pregnancy is explicit sex discrimination. 128 The dispositive
question in subsequent cases has become whether a plaintiff's discrim-
ination claim stems from a classification based on infertility alone or
on potential pregnancy.1 29 The difficulty inherent in attempting to
make this distinction is created by the biological fact that infertility
always relates, in some fashion, to potential pregnancy because the
122. See id.
123. See id. at 647.
124. See infra notes 128-163 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 164-192 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 251-267 and accompanying text.
128. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991) (concluding that a
policy was discriminatory because it classified based on childbearing capacity "rather than fertil-
ity alone").
129. Johnson Controls did not offer a more precise guideline to determine when treatment of
infertility becomes related to potential pregnancy because the employer's policy did not classify
solely based on fertility. See id. The policy expressly singled out women, thus obviating the need
for a discussion about the sex-specific nature of an infertile woman's quest to become pregnant.
Id.
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very definition of infertility focuses on the ability to become
pregnant. 130
The potential lines that can be drawn between sex-neutral classifica-
tions related to infertility and sex-specific classifications based on in-
fertility can be organized in to an infertility chart. The chart separates
the potential classifications into four categories: sex-specific, infertil-
ity-based classifications (S/I); sex-specific, infertility treatment-based
classifications (S/IT); sex-neutral, infertility-based classifications (N/I);
and sex-neutral, infertility treatment-based classifications (N/IT).
FIGURE 1: INFERTILITY CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER TITLE VII
S/I: Sex-specific, infertility-based N/I: Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
S/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based classifications
The columns of the infertility chart separate classifications based on
whether the classifications are sex-neutral or sex-specific. The rows of
the infertility chart separate classifications that focus on infertility
from classifications that focus on infertility treatment. The significance
of categorizing classifications in this manner stems from the manner in
which infertility has been addressed under Title VII. Whether and to
what extent a court distinguishes between these classifications can
make a critical difference in the outcome of a case. As this Note will
argue, Hall correctly identified the type of classification at issue, while
other courts have mischaracterized the employers' classifications,
causing disparate reasoning and outcomes in resolving Title VII cases
involving infertility and infertility treatments.
130. The medical definition of infertility is a "l-year period of unprotected intercourse with-
out successful conception." HoRowrrz, supra note 64, at 507.
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1. S/I: Sex-Specific, Infertility-Based Classifications Violate Title VII
Sex-specific, infertility-based classifications fall within S/I of the in-
fertility chart. S/I encompasses classifications that focus on a woman's
childbearing capacity and her ability or inability to become pregnant.
Johnson Controls is instructive in determining whether classifications
of this type explicitly violate the PDA. The employer's policy in John-
son Controls specifically prohibited women who were either pregnant
or "capable of bearing children" from working in certain factories. 31
The Johnson Controls Court stated that classifications based on the
potential for pregnancy are facially discriminatory under the PDA.132
The employer's policy in Johnson Controls violated the PDA by ex-
cluding a group of employees based on the sex-specific characteristic
of childbearing capacity.133 Thus, because classifications that focus on
a woman's childbearing capacity-her ability or inability to become
pregnant-necessarily relate to her potential for pregnancy, sex-spe-
cific, infertility-based S/I classifications violate Title VII under the ex-
plicit language of the PDA.
FIGURE 2: S/I CLASSIFICATIONS VIOLATE TITLE VII
811: Sex-specific, infertility-based Nil Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
SViolate Title VII
(Johnson Controls)
S/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/IT Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based cassifications
2. N/I: Classifications Based on Infertility Alone
Sex-neutral, infertility-based classifications fall within N/I of the in-
fertility chart. This would encompass classifications that focus on the
condition of infertility in general. For example, an employer's deci-
sion to terminate all infertile employees would be an N/I classification.
131. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
132. See id. at 199.
133. See id.
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The Johnson Controls Court indicated that these classifications do not
explicitly violate Title VII by stating that classifications based on "fer-
tility alone" might not amount to sex discrimination under the
PDA.134 The implication of the Court's language is that had the em-
ployer excluded all fertile employees from its workplace, the policy
may have passed muster under Title VII.135
An employment practice or policy that truly focuses on infertility or
fertility as a condition will rarely occur. In fact, while Title VII cases
often address classifications based on infertility treatment (for exam-
ple, the termination of a female employee for undergoing IVF or the
exclusion of infertility treatment from an employer-provided health
plan), fetal protection policies appear to be one of the only factual
scenarios in which the practice or policy actually classifies based only
on reproductive capacity (for example, fertile but not infertile employ-
ees may perform certain tasks). The applicability of the Johnson Con-
trols Court's "fertility alone" language to all cases relating to
infertility and infertility treatment under Title VII and the PDA is not
entirely clear. The employer's policy in Johnson Controls explicitly
excluded women based on their childbearing capacity. 136 Thus, the
Court did not need to analyze the sex-specific or sex-neutral qualities
of infertility. Instead, the facts presented a blatant bias that the Court
recognized as facially discriminatory: fertile women, but not fertile
men, were excluded from the employer's workforce.1 37 In essence,
the discriminatory nature of the policy had nothing to do with fertility.
The policy would have been equally discriminatory had women of any
characteristic been excluded from the workplace while men of the
same characteristic were not.138
Nevertheless, despite the indirect manner in which the "infertility
alone" language arose in Johnson Controls, it has been heavily relied
on by subsequent courts and has created the starting point for infertil-
ity analysis under Title VII. Thus, under Johnson Controls, N/I classi-
fications do not violate Title VII as explicit sex discrimination.
However, from another perspective, any classification based on in-
fertility violates the PDA because infertility is inherently and in-
134. See id. at 198 (concluding that a policy was discriminatory because it classified based on
childbearing capacity, "rather than fertility alone").
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 197.
138. All of the following policies discriminate based on sex: literate women, but not literate
men, are excluded from an employer's workforce; tall women, but not tall men, are precluded
from coming to work; overweight women, but not overweight men, will not be hired by the
employer.
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separably related to the ability to become pregnant, an ability that
only women, of course, possess. 139 The district court's decision in
Pacourek could be read to reflect this view.140 There, the woman had
a medical condition that prevented her from becoming pregnant natu-
rally.14' The court held that her medical condition was a "related
medical condition" under the PDA because it affected her potential
for pregnancy. 142 According to the court, infertility can always be
classified as a "medical condition rendering [a woman] unable to be-
come pregnant naturally," thereby affecting a woman's potential for
pregnancy. 143 Under this view, infertility is a "related medical condi-
tion" under the PDA, and an employer's classification based on infer-
tility would, on its face, discriminate against women.144 Pacourek
could be read such that N/I classifications necessarily violate the PDA;
if classifications based on infertility are explicit sex discrimination be-
cause infertility is a medical condition related to pregnancy, then even
sex-neutral, infertility-based classifications would violate the PDA.
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the opportunity to
hold that the plaintiff's medical condition of infertility was related to
pregnancy. 145 The plaintiff's legal theory was that she was a member
of a protected class: "female with a pregnancy related condition, infer-
tility."'1 46 The Seventh Circuit declined to label infertility as a related
medical condition under the PDA.147 To do so, the court reasoned,
"'would result in the anomaly of defining a class that simultaneously
includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is somehow vulnerable
139. See Cintra D. Bentley, A Pregnant Pause: Are Women Who Undergo Fertility Treatment
to Achieve Pregnancy Within the Scope of Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act?, 73 CI.-
KENT L. REV. 391, 417 (1998).
140. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The court did not
hold that a sex-neutral, infertility-based policy would violate the PDA because the issue was not
before it:
The court does not find persuasive defendants' argument that, since both men and
women cannot become pregnant, infertility is a gender-neutral condition .... If it is
defendants' contention that their policy was one of gender-neutral discrimination
against infertile workers, then the issues such a policy raises would be before the court.
Id. at 1403-04.
141. See id. at 1403.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1403-04.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
145. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008). "We recognize that our analysis
differs from the legal theory set forth in Hall's complaint-that infertile women are a protected
class under the language of the PDA." Id.
146. See id. at 646.
147. See id. at 648.
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to sex discrimination."' 148 Thus, Hall's conclusion is in accord with
Johnson Controls's conclusion that N/I classifications do not violate
Title VII.
FIGURE 3: N/I CLASSIFICATIONS Do NOT VIOLATE TITLE VII
S/I: Sex-specific, infertility-based N/1: Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
* Violate Title VII Do not violate Title VII
(Johnson Controls) (Johnson Controls, Hall)
S/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/IT:. Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based classifications
3. S/IT: Sex-Specific, Infertility Treatment-Based Classifications
Sex-specific, infertility treatment-based classifications fall within
S/IT of the infertility chart. This encompasses classifications that fo-
cus on the infertility treatment that is specific to women. Hall directly
addressed this type of classification.1 49 Hall was faced with a classifi-
cation based on IVF, an infertility treatment performed only on
women for the specific purpose of becoming pregnant. 50 The court
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the PDA in
Johnson Controls and its conclusion that "the PDA prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant."'1 51
The Hall court reasoned that adverse treatment based on the sex-spe-
cific treatment of surgical impregnation procedures would always af-
fect women on the basis of their ability to become pregnant. 152 Thus,
the Hall court held that this classification violated the PDA because it
discriminates against women based on their childbearing capacity.153
According to Hall, classifications that fall within S/IT violate the PDA
as explicit sex discrimination.' 54
148. Id. (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003)).
149. See id. at 647.
150. See id.
151. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
152. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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However, not all courts have concluded that S/IT classifications vio-
late Title VII. The Second Circuit maintains the opposite view. In
Saks, the Second Circuit upheld an employer's benefits plan that ex-
pressly excluded surgical impregnation procedures.155 Although faced
with a sex-specific, infertility treatment-based classification, Saks held
that Title VII had not been violated. 156 Because both sexes can be
infertile and because both men and women are diagnosed with infer-
tility with essentially equal frequency, the Saks court concluded that
the S/IT classification was not discriminatory.1 5 7 This conclusion
stemmed from the Saks court's focus on infertility as a condition as
opposed to the sex-specific infertility treatment that was at issue. The
court noted that because both men and women can be the underlying
cause of infertility among couples, the sex of the partner requiring
treatment will vary depending on the couple's situation, 158 and while
surgical impregnation procedures are performed only on women, male
participation is required. 159 Accordingly, the court opined that to la-
bel infertility as sex-specific would "result in the anomaly of defining a
class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and
yet is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination." 160 Thus, the infer-
tility chart contains conflicting results within S/IT.
FIGURE 4: CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT REGARDING S/IT CLASSIFICATIONS
S1: Sex-specific, infertility-based NI: Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
* Violate Title VII * Do not violate Title VII
(Johnson Controls) (Johnson Controls, Hall)
S/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/T: Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based classifications
" Violate Title VII (Hall)
" Do not violate Title VII (Saks)
155. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003).
156. See id.
157. See id at 346; Bentley, supra note 139, at 394-95 (1998).
158. See Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 346.
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FIGURE 5: EIGHTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT N/IT CLASSIFICATIONS
Do NOT VIOLATE THE PDA
S/I: Sex-specific, infertility-based NI: Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
* Violate Title VII Do not violate Title VII
(Johnson Controls) (Johnson Controls, Hall)
S/LT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based classifications
" Violate Title VII (Hall) * Do not violate Title VII
" Do not violate Title VII (Saks) (Krauel)
4. N/IT: Sex-Neutral, Infertility Treatment-Based Classifications
Finally, sex-neutral, infertility treatment-based classifications fall
within N/IT of the infertility chart. This includes classifications that
focus on infertility treatment in general, without specifically identify-
ing infertility treatments that are performed on women in order for
her to become pregnant. The Eighth Circuit in Krauel dealt with such
a classification, and it held that an employer's plan that excluded all
infertility treatments did not violate the PDA.161 The court reasoned
that infertility is fundamentally distinct from pregnancy and child-
birth, which occur after conception, while infertility prevents concep-
tion.162 This view asserts that infertility is the complete opposite of
the potential for pregnancy, precluding the conclusion that infertility
is related to potential pregnancy under the PDA.163 Thus, N/IT classi-
fications would not discriminate against women under the PDA.
B. Hall is Consistent with Congress's Intent Behind the PDA
The Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning used by the Eighth and
Second Circuits, which respectively concluded that sex-neutral, infer-
tility treatment-based classifications and sex-specific, infertility treat-
ment-based classifications do not violate Title VII. Both the Eighth
and Second Circuits analyzed the classifications without identifying
the category in which they would fall on the infertility chart; the temp-
161. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
162. See id. at 675.
163. See id.
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tation appears to be to analyze all classifications that somehow relate
to infertility as though they sex-neutral, infertility-based N/I classifica-
tions. This Sub-section discusses the differences between the ratio-
nales used by the different circuit courts when classifying infertility
and the effect of a misplacement within the infertility chart on the
Title VII analysis.
In Krauel, the court held that an insurance plan that excluded all
infertility treatments did not discriminate against women under either
a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. 164 The Krauel court
was faced with a N/IT classification, a gender-neutral, infertility treat-
ment-based classification. The Krauel court focused on the distinction
that "[p]regnancy and childbirth, which occur after conception, are
strikingly different from infertility, which prevents conception." 165 By
focusing on the pre-conception distinction between pregnancy and in-
fertility, the court focused on infertility as a condition, therefore ana-
lyzing the employer's classification as though it was a N/I sex-neutral,
infertility-based classification. Thus, when faced with the question of
whether the employer's intent to exclude infertility treatments could
demonstrate intent to exclude based on sex or pregnancy, the court
dismissed the question because it had already determined that infertil-
ity was sex neutral. 166 The Krauel court rejected the argument that
treatment for infertility was related to a woman's childbearing
capacity.167
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the pre-conception
distinction discussed in Krauel, noting that it was specifically fore-
closed by Johnson Controls's application of the PDA to classifications
based on the pre-conception "potential for pregnancy."' 68 The Hall
court also identified that the classification at issue-IVF-was based
on an infertility treatment rather than simply infertility. 169 Hall recog-
nized that surgical impregnation procedures are sex-specific because
they are only performed on women, based on their childbearing ca-
pacity. 170 Both the Hall court's rejection of the pre-conception dis-
tinction and the court's focus on the treatment at issue indicate that
had the Hall court been faced with a sex-neutral, infertility treatment-
based classification like the one in Krauel, it may have analyzed the
164. See id. at 681.
165. Id. at 679.
166. See id. at 680.
167. See id.
168. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
169. See id. at 649.
170. See id.
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case differently. By rejecting the Krauel court's rationale for distin-
guishing potential pregnancy from infertility, the Hall court recog-
nized that infertility is not always separable from potential pregnancy.
And by focusing on the treatment at issue, rather than the condition
of infertility, the Hall court was able to conclude that discrimination
based on a procedure that is performed on a woman based on her
childbearing capacity violates the PDA. Faced with a sex-neutral, in-
fertility treatment-based classification, the Hall court would presuma-
bly ask whether and to what extent infertility treatments are
performed on women based on their childbearing capacity. This dif-
fers from the Krauel court's focus on whether the condition occurs
pre-conception or whether the condition-not the classification-is
sex-neutral.
In Saks, the Second Circuit upheld the legality of an employer's
benefit plan that provided coverage for infertility treatment for all
employees but expressly excluded surgical impregnation proce-
dures.171 Thus, the procedure was both sex specific and infertility
treatment-based because surgical impregnation procedures are treat-
ments performed only on women, based on their childbearing capac-
ity. 172 Yet, the court held that the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures did not violate the PDA.173 The court reasoned that surgi-
cal impregnation procedures are used to treat the sex-neutral condi-
tion of infertility.174 The court opined that in order to classify on the
basis of sex, the classification had to relate to a condition unique to
women.175 By analyzing the employer's exclusionary policy in this
manner, the Saks court focused on the policy as a sex-neutral, infertil-
ity-based N/I exclusion, rather than a sex-specific, infertility treat-
ment-based S/IT classification. The court noted that surgical
impregnation procedures are used to treat infertility that is caused by
both male and female factors.' 76 Thus, according to the court, the
plan's express exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures treated
and affected male and female employees equally.' 77
The Saks court ignored both the infertility treatment-based nature
of the employer's exclusion and the sex-specific nature of the exclu-
sion. Saks and Hall focus on the same medical procedure-surgical
171. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003).
172. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
173. See id.
174. See Saks, 316 F.3d at 345-46.
175. See id. at 346.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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impregnation.178 The employment practices in both Saks and Hall
were based on a sex-specific, infertility treatment-based classifica-
tion.17 9 However, by focusing on the condition rather than the treat-
ment, the Second Circuit in Saks failed to recognize that the
employer's exclusion applied only to women employees: 180 while both
men and women can be infertile, and while surgical impregnation pro-
cedures are used to treat infertility that is caused by both male and
female factors, surgical impregnation procedures can only be per-
formed on women, based on their childbearing capacity.1 81 The Hall
court recognized that such procedures are therefore not sex neutral.182
The Seventh Circuit's recognition of surgical impregnation proce-
dures as a sex-specific infertility treatment was faithful to Congress's
intent behind the PDA. The undeniable connection between IVF and
pregnancy may compel the conclusion that discrimination based on
IVF is sex-specific and violates the PDA. IVF, as the court noted, is
performed on women to cause them to become pregnant. 18 3 The pro-
cedure is not performed on men because of the obvious difference in
reproductive capacity. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in
Gilbert, "[I]t is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily dif-
ferentiates the female from the male. ' 184 In fact, the House Report
for the PDA quotes this exact language. 185 Accordingly, IVF is intrin-
sically connected to a woman's potential to become pregnant. The
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls made clear that dis-
crimination based on a woman's potential for pregnancy must be re-
garded as explicit sex discrimination under Title VII.186
This holding comports with Congress's intention to use the PDA as
a means of returning "commonsense" to an analysis of sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.187 IVF is performed only on women, 188 and
while the PDA was meant in part to eliminate the need for a disparate
178. Compare Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49 (addressing the plaintiff's termination for undergoing
IVF, a surgical impregnation procedure), with Saks, 316 F.3d at 341 (analyzing the express exclu-
sion of surgical impregnation procedures from the infertility treatments that were covered by the
employer-provided benefits plan).
179. See id.
180. See Saks, 316 F.3d at 341.
181. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
182. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648 (quoting Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198
(1991)).
183. See MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 1069-70 (3d ed. 2003).
184. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 2.
186. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
187. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
188. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
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impact analysis, the obvious disparate impact of termination based on
undergoing IVF further supports the Seventh Circuit's decision.1 89
Only women will undergo IVF.190 Only women can be terminated for
taking time off to undergo IVF.191 In all instances where an employee
is discharged for taking time off to achieve surgical impregnation, the
employee will be a woman.192 Thus, whether conducting a disparate
treatment or disparate impact analysis, terminating an employee for
undergoing surgical impregnation procedures violates the Title VII.
C. Does Hall Extend Past Surgical Impregnation Procedures?
The narrow focus on the plaintiff's specific surgical impregnation
procedure made the court's conclusion in Hall a seemingly straightfor-
ward one: classifying a woman based on a surgical impregnation pro-
cedure that is performed only on women for the purpose of achieving
pregnancy constitutes discrimination under Title VII.193 However, the
court's reasoning extends beyond IVF procedures. Under the holding
in Hall, sex-specific, infertility treatment-based S/IT classifications vi-
olate the PDA. But the effect of the court's holding on the legal issues
involving types of infertility treatments other than surgical impregna-
tion procedures is not immediately clear.
Identifying the potential scope of the Hall decision depends on
one's analysis of the court's reasoning. The court relied on two char-
acteristics of IVF to come to its conclusion. First, IVF can only be
performed on women.194 Second, IVF's purpose-to facilitate preg-
nancy-directly relates to a woman's potential for pregnancy.1 95 An
emphasis on the court's first distinction-that IVF is performed only
on women-limits Hall's application to classifications based on sex-
specific infertility treatments such as surgical impregnation proce-
dures. 196 An emphasis on the second distinction-that treatment re-
lates to a woman's potential for pregnancy-extends the application
189. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3 ("By making clear that distinctions based on pregnancy
are per se violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in most instances to rely on
the impact approach, and thus would obviate the difficulties in applying the distinctions in
Satty.").
190. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 648-49.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. Under this interpretation, classifications
falling within S/IT would violate Title VII, but classifications falling within N[IT would not.
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of Hall to classifications based on a woman's participation in infertility
treatments in general. 197
Hall could be interpreted as applying PDA protection only to surgi-
cal impregnation procedures and not to infertility treatment in gen-
eral. This interpretation relies on the court's focus on the fact that the
immediate intended result of IVF is impregnation. Because men can-
not become pregnant, IVF is only performed on women.198 Under
this interpretation, the sex-specific nature of surgical impregnation
procedures cannot be extended to infertility treatments in general be-
cause infertility treatments (other than impregnation) can be per-
formed on both men and women, and in fact, some infertility
treatments can only be performed on men.199
Alternatively, Hall can be interpreted broadly to suggest that
women seeking infertility treatment are protected by the PDA. This
interpretation recognizes a distinction between the condition of infer-
tility and a woman's treatment of infertility. The Hall court notes that
the condition of infertility itself is sex-neutral, and a classification
based on that condition would not violate the PDA.200 However, an
infertile woman who seeks infertility treatment does so to increase her
potential for pregnancy.201 Accordingly, any classification of a woman
based on her use of infertility treatments relates to her potential for
pregnancy.
This expansive interpretation addresses the difficulty with the lim-
ited interpretation's fictional separation of non-impregnating infertil-
ity treatments from the potential for pregnancy. 20 2 The goal of IVF is
for a woman to achieve pregnancy. 20 3 However, that same goal exists
for women whose infertility problems can be treated without actual
surgical impregnation procedures.20 4 Women who seek infertility
treatments-whether those treatments involve regulating hormone
levels to achieve ovulation, surgical correction of blocked fallopian
tubes, or impregnation through IVF-do so in order to become preg-
nant.20 5 Those treatments are performed because of a woman's p0-
197. See infra notes 211-218 and accompanying text. Under this interpretation, classifications
falling within either S[IT or N/IT would violate Title VII.
198. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
199. See Ohl et al., supra note 68, at 525; KOLETrIS, supra note 75, at 793.
200. See id. at 648 n.1 ("Notably, this understanding of Johnson Controls rests on the fact that
infertility is gender neutral .... ").
201. See Bentley, supra note 139, at 416-17.
202. See id. at 416-17.
203. See MAYO CLrmIc FAMILY HEALTH BOOK, supra note 183, at 1069-70.
204. See University of Chicago Medical Center, Infertility, supra note 10.
205. See MAYO CLINic FAMILY HEALTH BOOK, supra note 183, at 1069.
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tential for pregnancy.20 6 To draw the line at surgical impregnation
procedures ignores the self-evident purpose of all infertility treat-
ments: that a woman will achieve pregnancy. 20 7 In this sense, termina-
tion of a woman's employment because she was undergoing a surgery
to correct blocked fallopian tubes would be based on childbearing ca-
pacity as much as a termination for undergoing IVF. The expansive
interpretation recognizes that infertility treatments for women cannot
be separated from their potential for pregnancy.208 In light of the pur-
pose of the PDA, which was enacted to protect "the whole range of
matters concerning the childbearing process, '20 9 recognizing the con-
nection between a woman's infertility treatments and her potential for
pregnancy may be essential to the materialization of Congress's intent.
Regardless of whether the scope of Hall is read as limited or expan-
sive, the case unquestionably asserts that S/IT classifications, such as
those based on in vitro fertilization and surgical impregnation proce-
dures, violate Title VII.210 If the more expansive interpretation takes
hold, Hall indicates that all infertility treatment-based classifica-
tions-not simply surgical impregnation procedures-violate Title
VII.
D. Hall's Implications for Medical and Health Coverage Cases
Hall's conclusion that terminating a woman for undergoing IVF vio-
lates Title VII reaches further than employer termination practices.
Title VII prohibits discriminatory classifications in all aspects of em-
ployment, not simply termination of an employee.211 Thus, Hall's
holding is applicable to medical and health coverage as well, and it
may have far-reaching effects.
206. See id.
207. See Bentley, supra note 139, at 416-17 ("[W]hen a woman undergoes fertility treatment
she is seeking assistance with conception.").
208. See id. at 419-20.
The life experience of women undergoing fertility treatment is that a condition that
interferes with conception thwarts these women's attempts to become pregnant. This
condition is identified only after their failure to become pregnant. As a result, these
women have chosen to receive therapeutic treatment that, if successful, will result in
pregnancy. Therefore, a woman receiving fertility treatment has a potential for
pregnancy.
Id. at 420.
209. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 5.
210. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534"F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
211. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
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1. The Prohibition of Discriminatory Classifications Extends to
Benefit Plans
Under the PDA, a classification that is found to be discriminatory
cannot serve as a basis for any employment action.2 12 In Gilbert, the
Court did not find exclusion of pregnancy benefits discriminatory be-
cause there was "no risk from which men [were] protected and women
[were] not. ' 213 In Satty, a case decided by the Supreme Court one
year after Gilbert but prior to the enactment of the PDA, the Court
held that an employer's policy of depriving seniority to women who
were absent from work due to childbirth violated Title VII under a
disparate impact analysis.214 The Court distinguished the case from
Gilbert based on an ambiguous semantic distinction between the re-
fusal to extend the "benefit" of medical coverage in Gilbert from the
"burden" of denying seniority in Satty.215 The PDA dispelled this dis-
tinction by declaring that any classifications based on pregnancy are
discriminatory, regardless of whether the employer's action can be
categorized as a "burden" or a "benefit. 2 16 If a classification is based
on pregnancy or the potential for pregnancy, it is a per se violation of
Title VII. 217 Congress intended that the PDA apply to "all aspects of
employment-hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability, benefits,
sick leave, medical benefits, seniority, and other conditions of employ-
ment currently covered by Title VII. '218 Therefore, a classification
that is facially discriminatory in one practice will be facially discrimi-
natory in another.
2. The PDA's Mandate for Equal Treatment of Benefit Plans
Because the PDA was a reaction to Gilbert, a case in which the
employer denied its female employees pregnancy coverage in an oth-
erwise comprehensive plan, the PDA explicitly addresses Congress's
intent with regard to fringe benefits under Title VII.219 The PDA pro-
212. Satty attempted to distinguish Gilbert by creating a distinction between policies that deny
benefits and policies that impose burdens. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42
(1977). The PDA was enacted in order to obviate the difficulties in applying such a distinction.
See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
213. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 496-97 (1973)).
214. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 139-41 (1977).
215. Id. at 141-42; see H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751.
216. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
217. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991); H.R. REP., supra note
3, at 3.
218. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
219. See id. at 5-6.
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hibits employers from treating "pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions in a manner different from their treatment of other
disabilities. '22 0 Although the PDA does not mandate that employers
provide disability benefits, sick leave benefits, or medical benefits,2 21
it requires an employer who chooses to provide such benefits to do so
without discriminating on the basis of sex or pregnancy-related condi-
tions.2 22 The PDA "simply require[s] that pregnant women be treated
the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work. "223
3. Under Hall, Surgical Impregnation Procedures Must Be Treated
Non-Discriminatorily
The Hall court held that employment decisions based on IVF are
discriminatory because they are performed only on women, and on
the basis of their childbearing capacity.2 24 Because surgical impregna-
tion procedures are inextricably tied to the potential for pregnancy,
classifications based on such procedures must be regarded "in the
same light as explicit sex discrimination. ' 225 Accordingly, classifica-
tions based on surgical impregnation procedures are explicitly
discriminatory. 226
Extending Hall, classifications based on surgical impregnation pro-
cedures are impermissible in "all aspects of employment-hiring, rein-
statement, termination, disability benefits, sick leave, [and] medical
benefits. '227 Just as an employer may not limit its coverage based on
pregnancy, an employer may not limit its insurance benefits based on
any other impermissible classification, including potential for preg-
220. See id. at 5.
221. See id. at 5-6. Some states mandate that insurance providers offer some kind of coverage
for infertility treatment, including Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. See Katherine E. Abel, Note, The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37
CONN. L. REV. 819, 823 (2005). California, Connecticut, and Texas require that insurance cover-
age be offered, but consumers may choose not to purchase it. Id.
222. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
223. Id. at 4.
For example, if the medical plan covers all medical and hospital costs of employees, all
the costs related to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions must be fully
covered. There can be no special conditions placed as to the number of days or dollar
amount unless that limitation applies to all disabilities covered by the medical benefits
plan.
Id. at 6.
224. Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648-649 (2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
225. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198, 199 (1991).
226. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
227. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4 (1978).
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nancy. 228 Classifications based on surgical impregnation procedures
are necessarily based on the potential for pregnancy.229 As such, sur-
gical impregnation procedures may not be singled out or excluded to
any greater extent than other medical conditions. 230 Coverage for sur-
gical impregnation procedures must be provided under the same
terms and conditions as coverage for other medical costs. 231
a. Hall and Saks Cannot Be Reconciled
Hall and Saks cannot be reconciled. Saks involved an employer's
insurance policy that specifically excluded coverage for surgical im-
pregnation procedures, while Hall involved an employer's termination
of a woman based on her surgical impregnation procedure. Both clas-
sifications focus on infertility treatment, not on infertility as a condi-
tion. And both classifications focus on a sex-specific infertility
treatment: surgical impregnation procedures. Thus, both classifica-
tions are sex-specific, infertility treatment-based classifications falling
within S/IT of the infertility chart. The PDA clarified that the distinc-
tion betweep benefits and burdens does not bear any weight on
whether discrimination occurred.232 In Hall, the fact that the discrimi-
nation took the form of a burden (termination) while in Saks, the dis-
crimination took the form of withholding a benefit (the exclusion of
coverage) does not change the underlying analysis of whether the clas-
sification is related to childbearing capacity.233 If the classification
(here, surgical impregnation procedures) is related to potential preg-
nancy or childbearing capacity, discrimination based on that classifica-
tion is sex-specific and violates Title VII.234 Hall recognizes that
surgical impregnation procedures enter the realm of potential preg-
nancy and are therefore protected by the PDA.235 Accordingly, under
a Hall analysis, which is arguably more consistent with the congres-
sional intent behind the PDA, the employer's plan in Saks violates the
PDA by failing to provide coverage for costs related to potential preg-
nancy in the same manner as the coverage it provides for other medi-
cal costs. 236
228. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
229. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
230. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 3.
233. See id.
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
235. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
236. See id.
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b. Hall's Effect on Krauel and Other Medical Benefit Cases
The employer's coverage plan in Saks would clearly violate the
PDA under the rationale of Hall because it expressly excluded cover-
age based on the precise S/IT classification that Hall identified as pro-
tected under the PDA. Hall may also impact those cases in which an
employer provides comprehensive medical coverage for its employees
but excludes all infertility treatments, such as the one in Krauel.
237
These plans would fall within N/IT of the infertility chart because they
classify based on infertility treatments but do not single out sex-spe-
cific infertility treatments. Because these plans would exclude cover-
age for infertility treatments equally for infertile men and women, the
exclusion would be a sex-neutral, infertility treatment based-
classification.
FIGURE 6: HALL'S APPLICATION TO N/IT CLASSIFICATIONS
Is UNCERTAIN
S/I: Sex-specific, infertility-based Ni: Sex-neutral, infertility-based
classifications classifications
* Violate Title VII * Do not violate Title VII
(Johnson Controls) (Johnson Controls, Hall)
SLIT: Sex-neutral, infertility-based N/IT: Sex-neutral, infertility
classifications treatment-based classifications
" Violate Title VII (Hall) * Do not violate Title VII
" Do not violate Title VII (Saks) (Krauel)
" Do not violate Title VII
(Limited interpretation of Hall)
" Violate Title VII (Expansive
interpretation of Hall)
Hall's application to benefit plans depends in part on the interpreta-
tion of Hall, as discussed in Part IV.C.238 Under the limited interpre-
tation of Hall, classifications based on surgical impregnation
procedures would violate the PDA.239 Non-surgical impregnation
treatments, however, such as a hormone treatments or surgical repairs
237. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1996). Hall would
only be extended to these types of scenarios if an expansive interpretation of Hall takes hold.
See supra notes 200-209 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
239. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of fallopian tubes, could be excluded as long as infertility treatments
for males were similarly excluded. Under this interpretation, infertil-
ity treatments that are not performed exclusively on women would
not relate to childbearing capacity. Thus, the employer's plan in
Krauel would not violate the PDA if it excluded infertility treatments
performed on both men and women.
Under the more expansive interpretation of Hall, however, infertil-
ity treatments for women could not be excluded to any degree if medi-
cal coverage is otherwise comprehensive. Under this interpretation,
any classification that excludes a woman's access to infertility treat-
ments relates to her potential for pregnancy and therefore violates the
PDA as explicit sex discrimination based on childbearing capacity.
Medical benefit plans or disability leave plans that exclude coverage
for infertility treatment would exclude treatment unique to women.
The PDA was enacted as a response to the Gilbert Court's flawed rea-
soning that pregnancy-related conditions are an additional risk unique
to women, so "the failure to compensate them for this risk [would] not
destroy the presumed parity of the benefits. ' 240 The PDA requires
that an employee medical benefit plan provide coverage for preg-
nancy, childbirth, and related medication conditions "under the same
terms and conditions of coverage for other medical conditions. '241
The House Report for the PDA provided an example: if the plan cov-
ers the medical and hospital costs of all employees, the plan must also
cover the costs related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions. 242 Thus, the evenhanded exclusion of benefits that ex-
cluded coverage for infertility treatment excludes treatment related to
a woman's potential for pregnancy. Under this interpretation of Hall,
infertility treatment must therefore be treated the same as treatment
for other medical conditions. If a court were confronted with a case
with the facts of Krauel, this reading of Hall would lead to the conclu-
sion that the employer's exclusion of infertility treatments violates the
PDA. 243
240. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1976).
241. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
242. Id.
243. Even if excluding infertility treatment from insurance coverage plans is not facially dis-
criminatory and is instead seen as facially neutral, a focus on the infertility treatment-based (as
opposed to infertility-based) nature of such exclusions may lead to the conclusion that the exclu-
sions violate Title VII because they have a disparate impact on women. The burdens from the
costs associated with infertility treatments fall more heavily on women than on men, violating
Title V1I under a disparate impact analysis. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 37, at 181-83. Women face a greater financial burden when infertility treatment
is excluded because women are subject to more tests and procedures to treat infertility, even if
the male partner is the source of the problem. See Brietta R. Clark, Erickson v. Bartell Drug
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This expansive interpretation leads to a curious result. Under this
expansive interpretation, the PDA would require that employers'
medical benefits plans cover infertility treatments for women if the
plan is otherwise comprehensive. 244 The threshold question under the
PDA becomes whether infertility treatments are treated the same as
other conditions, as opposed to whether infertility treatments are pro-
vided equally between men and women employees. An equal exclu-
sion of all infertility treatments would discriminate based on women's
childbearing capacity because the excluded coverage-women's ac-
cess to infertility treatment-relates to potential for pregnancy.
245
However, an employer who covers all infertility treatments but only
for women could potentially violate Title VII by discriminating against
men. This is an admittedly odd result, which would be justified under
the expansive interpretation by the rationale that access to infertility
treatment means something different to women than to a man: infer-
tility treatment is uniquely related to the potential for pregnancy (re-
quiring protection under the PDA), but infertility treatments is not
related to a man's potential for pregnancy. Thus, the expansive inter-
pretation of Hall could potentially require an employer whose medical
plan covers other medical costs to cover infertility treatment for both
women (to satisfy the PDA's prohibition of discrimination based on
pregnancy) and for men (to satisfy Title VII's general prohibition of
sex discrimination).
This result may suggest to some courts that sex-neutral, infertility
treatment-based N/IT classifications cannot serve as the basis of sex
discrimination. However, applying the expansive interpretation of
Hall to Krauel and similar cases at least appears to adhere to the un-
derlying purpose of the PDA. The PDA prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against women based on their potential for pregnancy.
246
Women seek infertility treatments, including surgical impregnation
Co.: A Roadmap for Gender Equality in Reproductive Health Care or an Empty Promise?, 23
LAW & INEQ. 299, 320 (2005). Additionally, because the structural defects that cause male infer-
tility can more frequently be linked to noninfertility-related conditions than can the causes of
female infertility, infertility treatments that are specific to men could often be covered by the
policy as non-fertility related, making the exclusionary policy more exclusionary for women than
for men. See id. The structural deficiencies that often cause male infertility can potentially be
covered despite a plan's exclusion of infertility treatments because these deficiencies may be
considered related to something other than infertility. See id. The disparity created by the fact
that male infertility can be linked to noninfertility-related medical conditions is significant, as
"infertility is hormonal [and not structural] in women 30 percent of the time, but only about 10
percent of the time in men." Id.
244. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
245. See id.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006); Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
198-99 (1991).
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procedures, in order to become pregnant or to increase their potential
for pregnancy.247 While the PDA does not require an employer to
provide benefits, should an employer choose to do so, it must do so
non-discriminatorily. 248 Accordingly, medical treatment that relates
to women's childbearing capacity must be provided in the same man-
ner as other medical treatment. 249 A benefit plan that excludes infer-
tility treatment inhibits women's childbearing capacity in the same
manner as would the exclusion of coverage of other pregnancy-related
treatment. Under the expansive interpretation of Hall, when an em-
ployer provides an otherwise comprehensive plan, excluding coverage
for infertility treatments discriminates against women.250 Congress in-
tended to eradicate such a result through the enactment of the
PDA.251
V. IMPACT: THE WORKING WORLD AFTER HALL V. NALCO
Hall v. Nalco clarified the scope of the PDA by holding that termi-
nating a female employee for undergoing IVF violates Title VII.252
For the plaintiff, the decision means that the defendant acted unlaw-
fully if the motivation for her discharge was truly her IVF treatment.
Beyond the scope of the specific facts on which Hall was decided, the
decision has implications for subsequent sex discrimination cases
under Title VII, the duties of employers, and the rights of employees.
A. What Hall Means for Title VII Sex Discrimination Law
The specific holding of Hall is clear: terminating a female employee
for undergoing IVF treatment violates Title VII.253 As the first fed-
eral circuit court to address the issue of discharge of an employee
based on IVF, Hall sets precedent in the Seventh Circuit and provides
a strong analysis for other circuit courts to follow. The extension of
Hall's precise holding to other employment practices and policies-
and to other infertility treatments besides IVF-may have far-reach-
ing effects.
247. See HoRowITz, supra note 64, at 507-09.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
249. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 5. "ITihis Bill would require that women disabled due to
pregnancy, childbirth, or other related medical conditions be provided the same benefits as those
provided other disabled workers. This would include temporary and long-term disability insur-
ance, sick leave, and other forms of employee benefit programs." Id.
250. See id. at 6.
251. See id. at 4.
252. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
253. See id. at 649.
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Undoubtedly, district courts will continue to face challenges involv-
ing sex discrimination based on infertility treatment, whether in the
context of hiring and firing decisions, insurance coverage, or any other
potentially discriminatory policy or practice. Those courts will have to
determine where in the infertility chart the particular claim lies, which
in turn will shape their decisions as to whether a particular challenge
is actionable under Title VII. The U.S. Supreme Court refrained from
labeling fertility as a medical condition related to pregnancy, and this
instructs courts that sex-neutral, infertility-based N/I classifications do
not violate Title VII.254 Unlike the Second and Eighth Circuits, how-
ever, which fail to consider the implications of an infertility treatment-
based classification, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hall provides
courts with another line of reasoning: where the medical procedure or
treatment in question is performed on women for the sex-specific pur-
pose of achieving pregnancy, it is related to women's childbearing ca-
pacity and cannot serve as a legitimate classification in employment
decisions.255
Courts following a limited interpretation of Hall would still differ
from the decisions in the Second Circuit by recognizing that IVF and
surgical impregnation procedures have a protected status. For courts
extracting a broader analysis from Hall, non-surgical impregnation
treatments, such as hormone treatments or structural correction sur-
geries pursued for the purpose of achieving pregnancy, would also be
related to childbearing capacity. This expansive interpretation may
more faithfully adhere to the PDA's prohibition of employment deci-
sions based on potential pregnancy because treatments performed on
a woman for the purpose of achieving pregnancy are necessarily re-
lated to her childbearing capacity.
B. What Hall Means for Employers
Employers subject to Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in
the workplace are affected by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hall.
At the very least, Hall tells employers that they may not subject a
woman to disparate treatment based on undergoing [VF.256 This ex-
tends not only to termination decisions but also to "hiring, reinstate-
ment..., disability benefits, sick leave, medical benefits, seniority, and
other conditions of employment. ' 257 Accordingly, an employer may
not base any adverse employment decision on a woman's participation
254. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-99 (1991).
255. See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
256. See id. at 645.
257. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
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in surgical impregnation procedures, nor can an employer single out
surgical impregnation procedures for exclusion from any benefit plans
that otherwise provide comprehensive coverage for infertility treat-
ments. Surgical impregnation procedures must be covered at least to
the same extent as other pregnancy-related medical cost.
Cautious employers may find it prudent to read Hall as requiring
extra attention when making decisions or enacting policies regarding
infertility treatment as applied to women. Under the expansive read-
ing of Hall-under which termination based on IVF violates Title VII
because the treatment relates to a female employee's childbearing ca-
pacity-an employer would violate the PDA by singling out a
woman's access to any infertility treatment. For example, an em-
ployer who chooses not to hire a woman because she is seeking infer-
tility treatment would violate the PDA. Similarly, an employer who
discharges a woman for undergoing a surgical procedure to correct a
blockage of her fallopian tubes would violate Title VII. Further, in
order to avoid discriminating against men in an attempt to comply
with the PDA, an employer may find it prudent to cover all infertility
treatment-for men and women-if the employer provides coverage
for other medical conditions.
Hall does not change the nature of the PDA, which does not affirm-
atively require any particular treatment for women.258 Instead, the
PDA requires that "women be treated the same as other employees
on the basis of their ability or inability to work" and provides that
women should not be treated differently based on pregnancy or po-
tential for pregnancy.259 Thus, while employers may not make deci-
sions motivated by a woman's decision to undergo a surgical
impregnation procedure, employers may take adverse action based on
a woman's inability to work. Accordingly, Hall does not assert that
female employees seeking surgical impregnation procedures are cate-
gorically protected from adverse employment action. For example, a
female employee cannot avoid the enforcement of a mandated attend-
ance policy because she is seeking surgical impregnation treatment.
Under the burden-shifting framework used in Title VII cases, employ-
ers have the opportunity to assert a legitimate and non-discriminatory
reason for its action or policy.260 An employer may still discharge a
female employee who takes time off to undergo such treatment if-
258. See id.
259. Id.; see Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-99 (1991).
260. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
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based on the employer's mandated attendance policy, for example-a
man taking that time off would have been discharged as well.
C. What Hall Means for Employees
Like employers subject to Title VII, employees are also affected by
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hall. Most specifically, Hall assures
female employees that they may not be punished or treated differ-
ently at work based on their decision to undergo surgical impregna-
tion procedures 261 The decision removes intentional discrimination
at work as one of the obstacles for a woman making the choice to
become a mother. For the female employee, Hall means that an em-
ployee's surgical impregnation cannot serve as the basis of adverse
employment action.
On a broader scale, by concluding that sex-specific, infertility treat-
ment-based classifications violate Title VII, Hall acknowledges the re-
lationship between those procedures and a woman's capacity to
become pregnant.262 The PDA reflects Congress's belief that such dis-
crimination "keeps women in low-paying jobs and deadend jobs," and
by refusing to allow employers to discriminate against a woman seek-
ing pregnancy through surgical impregnation, Hall is one step in the
continuous endeavor to remove women from the margins of the
workforce. The decision thus comports with Title VII's ultimate goal
of "eliminat[ing] those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered sexually stratified job environments to the disadvantage
of women. '263
D. The Impact of Hall on Assisted Reproductive Technology
Medical options available to women seeking pregnancy have
changed since the enactment of the PDA and Congress's decision to
include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions in its
definition of "because of sex." When Congress formulated the lan-
guage of the PDA in 1978, the ability to use assisted reproductive
technology did not yet exist.264 While the PDA did not anticipate the
scientific advances that would make pregnancy an option to women
for whom such an option did not previously exist, under Hall, those
new technologies cannot become the basis of sex discrimination.
261. See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, No. 06-3284, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 18449, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008).
262. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
263. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. See UC Davis Fertility Center, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 76.
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The temptation for courts and employers to treat infertility treat-
ments as voluntary and elective procedures that are not subject to pro-
tection is strong.2 65 The Supreme Court in Gilbert relied on its view of
pregnancy as often a "voluntarily undertaken and desired condi-
tion. '266 As new medical options become available, making preg-
nancy and the preservation of fertility possible, a similar temptation to
view such treatment as merely "voluntarily undertaken and desired"
still exists. However, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Gilbert and adopted its dissent, which dismissed the idea that
the "voluntary" nature of pregnancy supported its exclusion from the
employer's health coverage.2 67 A cancer patient's use of assisted re-
productive technology to preserve her fertility, an HIV-positive
couple's use of IVF to conceive a child that will not be infected, and
any woman's use of infertility treatment can all be seen as "voluntarily
undertaken and desired. ' 268 The PDA's refusal to adopt Gilbert's
holding mandates that courts' treatment of assisted reproductive tech-
nology will not be subject to the same flawed argument. Congress
could not predict and did not address these medical innovations when
it enacted the PDA; Hall provides an analytical lens through which
courts may view these medical innovations and their relation to a
woman's childbearing capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Surely, reproductive technology will continue to advance, and the
options available to infertile women will continue to grow. As preg-
nancy becomes possible for an increasing number of women through
an increasing variety of procedures, the inherent relationship between
reproductive technology and a woman's potential for pregnancy may
prohibit employers from using such technology as a basis for employ-
ment decisions. Hall recognizes that IVF is intrinsically connected to
a woman's potential to become pregnant, acknowledging Justice Ste-
vens' statement in his Gilbert dissent that "it is the capacity to become
pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male. '269
265. See Brietta R. Clark, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: A Roadmap for Gender Equality in
Reproductive Health Care or an Empty Promise?, 23 LAW & INEQ. 299, 333 (2005).
266. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
267. Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan commented that the employer in
Gilbert had not "construed its plan as eliminating all so-called 'voluntary' disabilities, including
sport injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, disabilities incurred in the commission of a
crime or during a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery." Id.
268. See Bedaiwy et al., supra note 4, at 490; Delvaux & N6stlinger, supra note 6, at 55.
269. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); H.R. RE1P., supra note 3,
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In doing so, Hall follows the Supreme Court's mandate that discrimi-
nation based on a woman's potential for pregnancy must be regarded,
under Title VII, as discrimination "because of sex." Hall concludes
that sex-specific, infertility treatment-based classifications violate Title
VII, and it potentially instructs employers that even sex-neutral, infer-
tility treatment-based classifications fail to comply with the PDA.
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